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Shearen: Parental Kidnapping in Minnesota

COMMENTS
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING IN MINNESOTA
[State v. Andow, 386 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1986)]
INTRODUCTION

Joseph Crumbley was one of the lucky ones., Law enforcement
authorities successfully sought, located and returned his sixteen
month old daughter, after her mother abducted her in August,
1984.2 The Andow facts are fairly typical of a "routine" child-snatching.3 This case illustrates an all-too-common scenario in America today.4 Due to increased numbers of fragmented families,5 thousands
1. As few as 10% of parents may ever see their stolen child again. Comment,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Recovery of Damagesfor Victims of Parental Kid-

napping, 1984 S.ILL. U.L.J. 145, 145 (1984) (90% of kidnapped children will never
again see the victim parent); see also Note, Tortious Interference with Custody: An Action to
Supplement Iowa Statutory Deterrents to Child Snatching, 68 IOWA L. REv. 495 (1983)

(seven out of ten kidnapped children are never seen again by victimized parent). The
director of Missing Children Minnesota estimates that nationally 50% of children
taken by a parent are never found or seen again by the victim parent. Telephone
interview with Carol Watson, Director, Missing Children Minnesota (Mar. 2, 1987).
2. Deborah Andow was the noncustodial parent of Jessica Christa Crumbley at
the time of the abduction. Brief for Respondent at 6, State v. Andow, 386 N.W.2d
230 (Minn. 1986). After Ms. Andow failed to return the child following court ordered visitation, Crumbley went to Ms. Andow's apartment to retrieve the child.
Andow, 386 N.W.2d at 231. He found no one there; just a letter addressed to
Andow's sister, stating that Andow had fled with the child. Id.
3. The Andow scenario is fairly typical in that the child was very young at the
time of the abduction (87% are 11 or younger), and that the abducting parent failed
to return the child after exercising court ordered visitation rights. This case was typical also because the absconding parent was the noncustodial parent at the time of the
kidnapping. See Reynolds, ParentalKidnapping. A Proposed Act for Expanding Tort Remedies, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 242, 243 (1986). However, Andow was atypical in that the

child was snatched by her mother and a custody order was in effect. Andow, 386
N.W.2d at 231. To the contrary, most children are snatched by their fathers and
most abductions occur before a custody order has been obtained. Reynolds, supra at
243.
4. Conservative estimates place the number of children abducted by their parents at 25,000 to 100,000 annually. See Note, The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act:
Application and Interpretation, 23J. FAM. L. 419 (1985) [hereinafter PKPA Note]. Sup-

port groups such as Child Find, of New Paltz, N.Y., and United Parents Against Child
Stealing, Inc., of Tucson, Ariz., place the number at 100,000-300,000 annually. The
preliminary data of one scientific study estimates the number at 459,000-751,000
each year. See Reynolds, supra note 3, at 242-43. Another group, the National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children "maintains that the number of abducted children
in the U.S. ranges from 4,000 to 20,000 per year, despite the Center's 'firm records'
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of American children are exposed to acrimonious parental relationships which put them at high risk of becoming victims of parental
kidnapping.6 As a result, extraordinarily high numbers of children
are actually stolen from one parent by the other parent. 7. Many of
these children are never seen again by the victim parent,8 creating an
intolerable situation for the children 9 and victim parents'O involved.
of 142 such incidents." Note, S. 321: The Missing Children Act - Legislation by Hysteria,
11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 671, 678-79 (1986) [hereinafter Dayton Note] (footnotes
omitted).
5. "High divorce rates, an increasingly mobile society, and recent court recognition of parents' equal rights to custody, together have led to an increasing number
of custody battles between citizens of different states, and even different countries."
Comment, ParentalKidnapping: Can the Uniform Child CustodyJurisdictionAct and Federal
ParentalKidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 Effectively Deter It?, 20 DuQ. L. REV. 43, 45
(1981); see also Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictonAct and
Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees,Joint Custody and Excessive Modifications, 65 CALIF. L.
REV. 978 (1977); Wallop, Children of Divorce and Separation, 15 TRIAL 34, 35 (1979).
6. "It is estimated that each year some 900,000 children are affected by the divorce of their parents and become a potential issue in the dissolution litigation."
Casenote, Child Stealing - State v. McCormick, 223 N. W2d 624 (Minn. 1978), 6 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 461, n.2. (1980); see also Comment, Family Law - Federal Courts Have

Jurisdiction to Enforce Provisions of ParentalKidnapping Prevention Act, 30 VILL. L. REV.
1010, n.2 (1985). It is likely that the number of parental kidnappings will continue to
increase in direct relation to the divorce rate. See PKPA Note, supra note 4, at 419.
7. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
9. Children who are victims of parental kidnappings are seriously harmed by
the situation. "[C]hild snatching is, indeed, a subtle and serious form of child
abuse." PKPA Note, supra note 4, at 423; see also Note, The ParentalKidnappingPrevention Act - Analysis and Impact on Uniform Child CustodyJurisdiction, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
553, 555 (1981).
Even though a child is snatched by one parent from the other, the circumstances surrounding the abduction, time, place, and degree of violence are
similar to a kidnapping by a stranger. The act of parental kidnapping is
both physically dangerous and psychologically devastating to both the parents and children involved.
Comment, supra note 1, at 148-49.
Young children may experience regression and tantrums, while older children experience feelings of fear, confusion, loss, abandonment, and rejection. The child's name is usually changed to avoid identification by law
enforcement authorities. In some cases, the child's emotional growth is
stunted, and his educational growth is slighted because kidnapped children
are usually kept out of school. The child may later become distrustful of
adults, and may view any return to the victimized parent as another
kidnapping.
Id. at 148; see also First National Conference on Interstate Child Custody and ParentalKidnapping Cases, 4 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 23 (1982) [hereinafter cited as First National
Conference]; Pick, Kidnapped!, 9 STUDENT LAWYER 28, 35 (1980).

10. Parents are also paralyzed and devastated when their children are abducted.
Victimized parents are initially stunned by the kidnapping. Victimized parents will usually blame themselves for the kidnapping and develop a sense of
failure. Not only do victimized parents spend large amounts of money in
search of their children, they must also spend money in obtaining psychiatric care necessary to cope with the loss of a child.
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As public awareness of the parental kidnapping problem, I has increased, the law has begun to respond to a need to deter and punish
2
abducting parents.'
Had Mr. Crumbley's situation occurred in Minnesota prior to
1963,13 in the eyes of the law, no crime would have been committed.14 In fact, if Minnesota law had been as the Minnesota Court of
Appeals stated in this case,15 Jessica might never have been located.' 6 Fortunately for other victim parents and children, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.17 Thus, the
legislature's determination to effectively address the parental kidnapping problem' 8 was affirmed.19 Subsequent to the Andow decision,
Comment, supra note 1, at 148 (footnotes omitted).
11. The terms "parental kidnapping", "child-snatching", "child-stealing", and
"parental abduction" are used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
12. See generally Reynolds, supra note 3; Dayton Note, supra note 4; Comment,
supra note 6.
13. Minnesota's first statutory attempt to redress the parental kidnapping problem was in 1963. That statute provided:
Whoever intentionally takes, confines or restrains his own child under the
age of 18 years with intent to prevent another from obtaining or retaining
his custody pursuant to an existing court order may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than two years or to payment of a fine of not more
than $2,000, or both.
Criminal Code of 1963, ch. 753, § 609.26, 1963 Minn. Laws 1185, 1203-04 (1963)
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (1963)).

14. Since parental abduction was not a crime as far as Minnesota was concerned,
the victim parent looked to federal law. The federal kidnapping statute (the Lindberg Act), however, expressly exempted parents by its terms. See First National Conference, supra note 9, at 25; Pick, supra note 9, at 28; Comment, supra note 5, at 47
n.19.
15. State v. Andow, 372 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). Jessica's abduction would not have constituted a crime because, as the Minnesota Supreme
Court later held, construing the applicable statutory provision 5(a) as a functional 14
day grace period would have made the lapse of 14 days an element of the crime.
Andow, 386 N.W.2d at 232. Probable cause that all elements of the crime have been
committed must exist before a felony warrant can issue. In Andow, since only 12 days
had elapsed since the abduction, no felony warrant would have been issued, and no
law enforcement assistance would have been available to locate or arrest the abducting parent. Id. at 232, 233.
16. "[AIli the studies that I've seen, the national legislation recognizes that the
first 48 hours of the abduction, whether it be by a parent or somebody else, is critical." Hearings on H.F. 1347 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 73rd Minn.
Legis., Feb. 20, 1984 (audio tape) (statement of Gloria Segal, Representative). The
48 hour period is so crucial because it provides time for the absconding parent to
physically disappear with the child, making tracing and locating very difficult. Id.
17. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
18.
[H.F. 1347, making parental kidnapping an immediate felony] is an important bill. The reluctance on the part of the police in the past has been due to
primarily the 14 day law. In my experience, we've had many situations
where the child was taken out of state, and because of the gross misdemeanor status of the old law ....
we got no cooperation from out of state
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the Minnesota Legislature amended the pertinent statute, 20 upholding the supreme court's ruling.21
This Comment begins with a brief overview of parental kidnapping. It will focus on Minnesota's statutory and judicial history regarding child-snatching and will propose additional alternatives.
I.

BACKGROUND

One can hypothesize that the abduction of children has probably
occurred as long as children have existed. Since the time of Solomon, 2 2 there have been recorded instances of child kidnapping. The
law has not, however, always recognized kidnapping of children (even
by strangers) as a wrong to be redressed.23 By the late nineteenth
century, kidnapping of children was regarded as injury to the father. 2 4 It is important to note that the law made a sharp distinction
authorities, particularly when the child and absconding parent could be located. The ingredient of the felony being added to this ... will add a tool
that will remove most of the reluctance on the part of the police to take
immediate action in trying to find the child and make an arrest of the absconding parent.
See Hearings on H.F. 1347 Before the House Committee on CriminalJustice, 73rd Minn.
Legis., Jan. 11, 1984 (audio tape) (statement of Harlen Locke, Executive Director of
Minnesota State Sherrifs' Ass'n). See infra notes 63-68 and 136-76 and accompanying
text.
19. Andow, 386 N.W.2d at 232.
20. The amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 609.26, subdivision 5 states:
"Clause (a) does not apply if the person returns the child as a result of being located
by law enforcement authorities. " Act of Mar. 25, 1986, ch. 445, § 2, subd. 5, 1986
Minn. Laws 779.
21. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
22. 1 Kings 3:16-28. Two women who had just given birth appealed to Solomon
to be awarded "custody" of a living child each claimed (one of the infants had died).
Solomon ordered that the child be cut in half, and a half was to be given to each
woman. One woman pleaded with Solomon not to destroy the child. The wise King
Solomon awarded custody to this woman, recognizing that her desire to preserve the
child's life showed her to be the child's true mother. Id.
23. The early common law distinguished between kidnapping of the heir and of
children who were not heirs.
As to the other, or abduction, or taking away the children from the father,
that is also a matter of doubt whether it be a civil injury or not; for, before
the abolition of the tenure in chivalry, it was equally a doubt whether an
action would lie for taking and carrying away any other child besides the
heir: some holding that it would not, upon the supposition that the only
ground or cause of action was losing the value of the heir's marriage ...
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 92, 93 (Cooley Ed. 1871).
24.
[A]n action would lie for taking away any of the children, for that the parent
had an interest in them all, to provide for their education. (d) If, therefore,
before the abolition of these tenures it was an injury to thfe-Tather to take
away the rest of his children, as well as his heir (as I am inclined to think it
was), it still remains an injury, and is remediable by writ of ravishment, or
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between fathers' and mothers' rights to their children.2 5
Since Roman times, the father had been recognized in the common law as the holder of the rights to the child.26 The mother's
right to the custody of the child was expressly subordinate.27 Child
custody law in America tracked the common law, usually awarding
custody to the father.28 This rule eventually evolved into a presumption that a mother's custody was preferable if the child was very
young. 29 Eventually, the automatic preference for the mother was
attacked as unfairly discriminating on the basis of sex.3 0 The resulting standard was sex-neutral, and custody determinations were to be
made on a case-by-case basis.31 This test was termed the "best interests test" and was used to determine what custodial arrangement was
in the best interest of the child.32 Thus, prior to the relatively recent
era of increased focus on the welfare of the child,33 parents' interests
action of trespass vi et armis, defilio, velfilia, rapto vel abducto; (e) in the same

manner as the husband may have it, on account of the abduct-n of his wife.
Id.
25. Blackstone speaks only of a father's right to not have his child kidnapped
from him. See id.; infra note 26 and accompanying text.
26.
The ancient Roman law gave the father the power of life and death over his
child, on the principle, that he who gave had also the power of taking away.
In the emperor Hadrian's time, this law was materially modified, but large
authority was permitted, for a son could acquire no property of his own,
during the life of his father, but all the profits of his acquisitions belonged to
his parent, at least for life.
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw 195 (Gavit ed. 1941); see also id. at 20.

27. "The mother had no legal power over the child in the father's lifetime, at
least as against the father. After the father's death she was entitled to the custody of
the child until he became 21, yet she could not appoint a guardian by will." A.
MANCHESTER, A MODERN LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES 1750-1950, 390
(1980).
28. See R. OLIPHANT, A PRIMER ON FAMILY LAW 111 (1986) (citations omitted).

29. This was called the "tender years doctrine." See id. "During the very young
years, especially in the case of girls, the mother can best take care of them, in ordinary circumstances, but in later years, they need the sterner discipline of the father."
Id. at 111 n.7. See also Eisel v. Eisel, 261 Minn. 1, 5-6, 110 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1961)
(court reviews Minnesota's long-standing policy of upholding the doctrine).
30. See Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern American Family Law, 2 J. FAM. L.

101, 102 (1962) (the divorced woman is awarded custody of the children in more
than 90% of cases); Oliphant, supra note 28, at I11.
31. See Oliphant, supra note 28, at 112-13.
32. Minnesota has used the best interest standard for quite some time. See, e.g.,
Curtiss v. Hagen, 280 Minn. 296, 159 N.W.2d 193 (1968) (custody of biological parents assumed to be in best interests of child); In re Campbell's Guardianship, 216

Minn. 113, 11 N.W.2d 786 (1943) (custody awarded to guardians rather than to biological parents). Minnesota has added a variation, in determining that custody
awards to the primary caretaker are in the best interests of the child. See Pikula v.
Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985).
33. For an excellent overview of childen's rights, the doctrine of parens patriae,
and the development of the best interests of the child standard, see McGough &
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in the child were regarded as superior 3 4 and when one parent
snatched a child from the other, no crime had been committed.35
Child-snatching was seen as a family matter; agencies were reluctant
to intrude.36
Increasingly, the law has recognized that it must serve the best interests of the child in the area of child custody.37 Child psychologists
now generally accept the proposition that it is paramount that the
child's needs must be considered most important to facilitate his or
her social, cognitive, emotional, and even physical development.38
The law concurs with this theory. What the child needs most is stablity in his everyday life, especially in his custodial arrangements.3 9
Parental kidnapping destroys the stability of a child in the most
abrupt and complete way possible.40 Just as it is destructive to the
4
children involved, it is equally devastating to the victim parents. '
Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209 (1978); see also COMMITTEE ON THE FAMILY OF THE GROUP FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, NEW TRENDS IN CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS,

21-47 (1980).
34. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
35. Minnesota's first attempt to punish parental kidnapping was in 1963. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text. "[U]nder the existing law of most states and
countries, child-snatching by a parent is usually condoned, often rewarded, and
rarely punished. Moreover, federal authorities and the Constitution to date have displayed a 'hands off' attitude." Foster & Freed, Child Snatching and CustodialFights: The
Case for the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1011 (1977).
The federal kidnapping statute expressly exempted parental kidnapping. See supra
note 14.

36. See, e.g., First National Conference, supra note 9, at 23; Foster & Freed, Family
Law, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 287 (1982).

37. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The best interests of the child are
served by stability in the child's relationships, as well as in custody determination. See
Bodenheimer, supra note 5, at 983; Foster & Freed, supra note 35, at 1020-21.
38. See, e.g., Note, supra note 1, at 498; Note, supra note 9, at 556-57.
39. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
40. The child is abducted and taken away from everything that is familiar to him;
he is prevented from seeing one of his parents, perhaps his siblings, and his friends.
His name may be changed and he may be kept home from school. Comment, supra
note 1, at 148.
41. The traumatic personal experiences of several victim parents are a part of the
legislative hearings. See Hearingson H.F. 1347 Before the House CriminalJusticeCommittee,
73rd Minn. Legis., Jan. 11, 1984 (audio tape) (testimony of Laurie Korwin, Marge
Romero, Mrs. Kasicki, Dean Drews and Eugene Albrecht, victim parents). Victim

parents are devastated by the abduction and frequently need psychiatric help. See
Comment, supra note 1, at 148. Pick, supra note 9, relates a particularly heartbreaking
story. Margaret Bejnarowicz was a Polish native who grew up in refugee camps
around the world. Id. at 28. She married her husband, Zygmunt, in 1966 and returned to his home, Chicago. Id. The couple had a son, Wojciech. Id. After the
son's birth, the husband threatened and physically abused her. Id. The couple separated and the father was given visitation rights to Wojciech. Id. Because she still felt
endangered, Margaret took her son and fled to London, in defiance of Zygmunt's
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The epidemic of child stealing42 was a situation in desperate need of
solutions.43
II.

A.

MINNESOTA LAW

State v. Olsen

In an early attempt to address the problem of parental kidnapping,
the Minnesota Legislature enacted Minnesota Statute section
609.26.44 That statute made it a felony for a parent to take, confine,
or restrain his own child under the age of eighteen years with intent
to prevent another from exercising his adjudicated custodial rights.45
Two cases, both involving the same parties, have dealt with the issue
visitation rights. Id. She lived there, essentially in hiding with Wojciech for five
years. Id. Then Zygmunt and his five hired detectives appeared, broke Margaret's
nose, grabbed Wojciech and returned to the U.S. Id. Back in the U.S., the court took
the custody dispute under consideration. Just before the court was to order custody
for Margaret, Zygmunt snatched Wojciech. Id. Margaret's private detective has been
unable to find the boy. See id.
The snatching of the child frequently results in the total disruption of the victim
parent's life.
Parents hire detectives and lawyers to help them search; they devote countless hours to following leads, which are sometimes based on purposefully
misleading information supplied by relatives of the abductor. The devotion
to the search may result in the loss of employment. Their lives are in limbo
because they do not know whether their children will ever be found. Serious depression is common. One mother could no longer eat normally; she
required periodic intravenous feedings. Another woman went from 135
pounds to 98 pounds in one month. Some, exhausted and frustrated, eventually give up the search and feel guilty about it. In any event, the parent's
emotional suffering is severe.
Reynolds, supra note 3, at 245.
42. "When Professor Barbara Armstrong wrote her important work on California family law in the early 1950's, child custody litigation [and, by implication, parental kidnapping] between geographically separated parents was still relatively rare."
Bodenheimer, supra note 5, at 978. Many authors have noted that as the divorce rate
has increased, the rate of parental abductions has risen correspondingly. See supra
notes 4-6 and accompanying text. The causes frequently cited are desperation (usually by the father) with the courts' custody determination, and revenge motives.
Most psychological experts say, however, that child kidnappings are frequently one partner's way of wreaking vengeance on the other ....
"To
take a child away does not say 'I love you' to that child. It says 'm getting
even with your mother.'"
Bodenheimer, supra note 5, at 978 (citations omitted); see also Hearings on HF. 1347,
S.F. 1318 Before the Senate Conference Committee on CriminalLaw, 73rd Minn. Legis., Mar.
16, 1984 (audio tape) (remarks of Bill Neiman, Assistant County Attorney, Hennepin
County).
43. See Bodenheimer, supra note 5, at 979; Foster & Freed, supra note 35, at 101112.
44. Enacted in 1963, Minnesota Statutes section 609.26 was Minnesota's first legislative attempt to deal with the parental abduction problem. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
45. See id.
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of parental kidnapping and the statute. In the first case, State v. 01sen, 4 6 the defendant was divorced from his wife in 1963.47 The divorce decree granted custody of the children to their mother, who
subsequently disappeared with the children. 48 After an unsuccessful
two and a half year search, the defendant located them in Milwaukee.49 He petitioned the court there for visitation rights, which were
granted.50 He then brought the children back to Minnesota for a
visit, and refused to return them at the court-designated time.51
When the wife obtained a court order directing Olsen to return the
children to her, he "dodged" service of the court's order. 52 He was
later convicted and sentenced for violating section 609.26.53
Although the case deals primarily with the defendant's knowledge of
the court order, 54 the case was important as it established the legislature's right to classify parental kidnapping as a felony.
In Olsen v. State,55 the second case dealing with the 1963 statute,
Olsen appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.
Against a barrage of claims of unconstitutionality,56 the Minnesota
Supreme Court again upheld the statute, 57 noting that the legislature's action in subsequently amending the statute was not evidence
58
that the original statute was unconstitutionally vague.
The legislature subsequently amended the statute in 1967.59
46. State v. Olsen, 278 Minn. 421, 154 N.W.2d 825 (1967).
47. Id. at 422, 154 N.W.2d at 825.
48. Id. at 422, 154 N.W.2d at 825-26.
49. Id. at 422, 154 N.W.2d at 826.
50. Id.
51. Id. The court in the second case involving Olsen, see infra notes 55-58 and
accompanying text, noted that Olsen's behavior in detaining his children (also at issue in the first case) "was undoubtedly provoked by his wife's inexcusable behavior
[in concealing the children's whereabouts from the father for over two years] and his
proper concern for the welfare of his children .
Olsen v. State, 287 Minn. 536,
537, 177 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1970).
52. Olsen, 278 Minn. at 423, 154 N.W.2d at 826.
53. Id. at 422-23, 154 N.W.2d at 825-26.
54. Id. at 423-24, 154 N.W.2d at 826.
55. Olsen v. State, 287 Minn. 536, 177 N.W.2d 424 (1970). Both cases, therefore, dealt with the same underlying parental abduction.
56. See id. at 536-37, 177 N.W.2d at 426.
57. Id. at 538-39, 177 N.W.2d at 427.
58. Id.
59. Criminal Code of 1963, ch. 753, § 609.26, 1963 Minn. Laws 1185, 1203-04,
amended by Act of May 18, 1967, ch. 570, § 1, 1967 Minn. Laws 1148-49. The
amended statute stated:
Whoever intentionally detains his own child under the age of 18 years
outside the state of Minnesota, with intent to deny another's rights under an
existing court order may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than
two years or to payment of a fine of not more than $2,000, or both.
MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (1967).
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There were two major changes. 60 First, the statute made it a felony
to "detain" one's own child outside the state of Minnesota. 6 1 Second,
the deprivation was of parental rights conferred under any court order, not just a custody order.62 The statute remained unchanged until 1977, when it was fatally challenged in State v. McCormick.63
B.

State v. McCormick

In McCormick, following a California divorce in 1976, the defendant's wife was given custody of the couple's two children and the
defendant was granted visitation rights.64 After the divorce, the exwife moved to Minnesota with the children.65 Soon after the defendant exercised his visitation rights in Minnesota, the children's mother
filed a civil neglect petition alleging that the defendant had sexually
abused the children.66 The court consequently issued an order restraining the defendant indefinitely from further contact with the
children.67 Several months later, the defendant abducted the children as they walked home from school and returned to California
with them. 6 8 The defendant was apprehended there by federal
agents and returned to Minnesota for prosecution under Minnesota
Statute section 609.26.69 McCormick successfully moved to dismiss
60. Compare the statutory language of the 1963 version. See supra notes 13, 59
and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 59.
62. Id.

63. State v. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1978).
64. Id. at 625.
65. Id.

66. Id. The McCormick facts are illustrative of the fact that parental abduction
situations are commonly abusive. See Comment, supra note 1, at 147-48; see also Note,
supra note 9, at 555 n.14. The remarks of Bill Neiman, Assistant County Attorney,
Hennepin County, during the hearings on the 1984 amendments are also illuminating: "I have yet to work on a case where it seemed even likely that the abducting
parent was truly concerned with the welfare of his child or even with his or her relationship with the child." See Hearings on H.F. 1347, S.F. 1318 Before the Senate Confer-

ence Committee on Criminal Law, 73rd Minn. Legis., Mar. 16, 1984, Apr. 3, 1984 (audio
tape) (remarks of Bill Neiman, Assistant County Attorney, Hennepin County). Many
articles have speculated about the reasons motivating parents to steal their children.
Some of these reasons include: impatience and dissatisfaction with court procedures
and awards, see Bodenheimer, supra note 5, at 979; revenge on the other parent, see
Comment, supra note 1, at 147; Pick, supra note 9, at 35; and forum shopping by
parents seeking modification of a custody determination, see Foster & Freed, supra
note 35, at 1013.
67. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d at 625.
68. See id.

69. Id. More than three months had elapsed before federal law enforcement officials located the defendant in California. Id. The defendant was also charged with
violating Minnesota Statute section 609.343, subdivision l(a) for second degree
criminal sexual conduct. Id. The second charge was not a part of the McCormick
appeal which addressed the parental kidnapping. Id.
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the claim on the basis of an unconstitutional assertion of
7
jurisdiction. 0
The then existing version of the statute required that the abducting parent intentionally detain "his own child under the age of 18
years outside the state of Minnesota, with the intent to deny an... 71 The supreme
other's rights under an existing court order.
court struck down the statute on two grounds. First, the court stated
that the operative verb "detains" could not be judicially expanded to
include "takes." 72 The court's reasoning was based on the fact that
the statute was criminal in nature and, therefore, was to be strictly
construed.73 Since the statutory language required the felonious act
to be detaining the child outside of Minnesota boundaries, 7 4 the
criminal act contemplated by the statute occurred entirely outside of
Minnesota. The court stated, " '[t]he penal acts of one state can have
no operation in another state. The courts of this state, have no
power to enforce here the criminal laws of another state. Here, laws
are local, and affect nothing more than they can reach.' "75
In addition to the unconstitutional extraterritorial assertion ofjurisdiction,76 the McCormick court held that section 609.2677 violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 7 8 to the
United States Constitution. Under the Minnesota statute, one who
in violation of a court order detained his own child outside Minne70. Id. The trial judge ruled in McCormick's favor and the Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed. Id. For a thorough discussion of the McCormick decision, see Casenote, supra note 6.
71. See supra note 59.
72. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d at 626-27.
73. Id. at 627. The McCormick court took notice that in construing the language
of section 609.26 the Olsen court stated that " 'detains' probably means the same as
'takes, confines or restrains' which was the language of the statute prior to its amendment by L.1967, c. 570." Id.; see Olsen, 287 Minn. at 538, 177 N.W.2d at 427.
74. "Whoever intentionally detains his own child under the age of 18 years outside
the state of Minnesota .
MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (1967) (emphasis added); see also
supra note 59.
75. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d at 626 (quoting People v. Merrill, 2 Parker's Crim.
Rep. 590, 603 (1855)).
76. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
77. Under this version of the statute, a resident parent who intentionally detained his child would be punished for a misdemeanor while an out of state parent
who intentionally detained his own child would be punished for a felony. The court
said: "We think that any such discrimination would result in a denial to nonresident
fathers of equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution." McCormick, 273 N.W.2d at 627 (quoting People v.
Jones, 257 Cal. App. 2d 235, 238-39, 64 Cal.Rptr. 622, 624 (1967)).
78. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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sota boundaries had committed a felony.79 In contrast, one who

wrongfully detained his child within state boundaries in violation of a
court order could only be found in criminal contempt of a court, a

misdemeanor. 80 Since the discrimination between resident and nonresident parents bore no relation to the punitive and deterrent pur-

poses of the statute, it was violative of constitutional equal protection
guarantees. 8'
As the McCormick court sounded the death-knell for the statute, it
expressed concern over the grievous situation:
While we recognize the serious dimensions of the social and economic problems the legislature seeks to correct, we are of the opinion that in adopting Minn.St. 609.26 it has reached too far. A more
effective solution is the adoption of interstate compacts to enforce
support orders, and the enactment of federal legislation which
avoids constitutional difficulties inherent in the assertion of extra82
territorial criminal jurisdiction by state courts.
An almost immediate overhaul of Minnesota Statute section
609.26 was evidence that the Minnesota Legislature disagreed.83
79. See supra note 59.
80. MINN. STAT. § 588.20, subd. 4 (1986).
81. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d at 627. The McCormick court relied heavily on a California case that arrived at the same result interpreting similar statutory language. Id.
(citing People v. Jones, 257 Cal. App. 2d 235, 64 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1967)). The Jones
case involved nonpayment of child support. Id. Jones was convicted of a felony
which discriminated solely on the basis that the father either remained out of state for
30 days during the period of the violation charged, or failed to comply with a court
order plus remained out of state for 10 days without complying. Id. at 238, 64 Cal.
Rptr. at 624. The Jones court found that "any such discrimination would result in a
denial to nonresident fathers of equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Id. at 239, 64 Cal. Rptr.
at 624.
82. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d at 628. In view of the subsequently successful legislative solutions, see infra notes 83-85, 124-31 and 168-75 and accompanying text, this
language is indicative that the McCormick court failed to perceive the seriousness of
the parental kidnapping problem, or to perceive the legislature's determination in
addressing it. The McCormick opinion also contains dictum which lends support to
the argument that the court failed to fully understand the scope of the problem. The
court said that "the act of detaining a child in violation of a court order ... is an
offense committed not so much against the child as against the other parent." 273
N.W.2d at 627.
83. In fact, the Minnesota Legislature responded directly to the McCormick
court's throwing down of the gauntlet by amending the statute.
The supreme court additionally held that 609.26 violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The child-stealing conduct is harmful
whether it occurs inside or outside the state, yet the statute only punishes
the latter. The [McCormick] court found this to be improper. The proposed
amendment, I believe, cures the constitutional infirmities in the statute.
The references to conduct taking place outside the state of Minnesota have
been deleted. Additionally, language has been added making it a crime to
take, conceal, or fail to return a child as well as to detain a child. These
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Most apparent was the jurisdictional provision which enlarged the
offending acts to include "takes, detains, or fails to return his own
child ...

in violation of an existing court order."84 The legislature's

intent to actively combat parental kidnapping was apparent.8 5
III.

FEDERAL'LAW

As the McCormick court had foreshadowed,86 changes also occured
on the federal level. Three major laws addressed the ever-growing
problem of parental abductions: the Uniform Child CustodyJurisdicion Act (U.C.CJ.A.),87 the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(P.K.P.A.),88 and the Federal Missing Children's Act.89 Each of these
will be discussed briefly.
A.

The Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct

The U.C.C.J.A. was promulgated by the Commission on Uniform
State Laws in 1968.90 Although its adoption by individual states was
changes should remedy both the jurisdictional and the equal protection
problems cited by the supreme court.
Hearings on H.F. 1238 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 71st Minn. Legis., Apr.

12, 1979 (audio tape) (statement of Representative Byrne).
84. Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 263 § 1, 1979 Minn. Laws 576, 576-77 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (1978)) which reads in part:
Subdivision 1. Whoever intentionally takes, detains or fails to return his
own child under the age of 18 years in violation of an existing court order
which grants another person rights of custody may be sentenced as provided
in subdivision 5.
Subdivision 2. Whoever detains or fails to return a child under the age of
18 years knowing that the physical custody of the child has been obtained or
retained by another in violation of subdivision I may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 5.
Id.
85. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text; infra notes 127, 144 and 160,
and accompanying text.
86. McCormick, 273 N.W.2d at 628. The McCormick court urged "adoption of
interstate compacts to enforce support orders, and the enactment of federal legislation . . . " Id.; see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
87. The U.C.C.J.A. was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1968. It is a model law which states may adopt, in
its entirety or with individual variations. 9 U.L.A. 116 (1979); see infra notes 90-106
and accompanying text.
88. The P.K.P.A., enacted in 1980, is federal legislation applicable to individual
states, if the parental kidnapping offense is classified as a state felony. Its provisions
are codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), 42 U.S.C. § 651
(1982 & Supp. III 1985); see infra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
89. The Missing Children's Act (Pub. L. No. 97-292) was enacted on October 12,
1982. As a federal law, it also applies to the states. See infra notes 117-20.
90. For an exhaustive and authoritative discussion of the U.C.CJ.A., see generally
Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L.
REV.

711 (1982).
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slow initially,91 by 1985 all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and
the Virgin Islands had adopted the Act.92 The Commissioners' pur-

pose was to deter child-snatching in custody disputes.93 The Act is
aimed at abducting parents who flee to another state to "forum
shop" and use the judicial process to search for a custody modifica91. By 1978, only 26 states had adopted the Act. See Comment, supra note 6, at
1012 n.9.
92. P. HOFF, PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: HOW TO PREVENT AN ABDUCTION AND WHAT
TO DO IF YOUR CHILD IS ABDUCTED 17 (1985). The U.C.CJ.A. citations for individual
states with year of enactment in parentheses are as follows: ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-20 to
-44 (1980); ALASKA STAT. 25.30.010 - 910 (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-401 to -

424 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2701 to -2726 (1979); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150 74 (West 1974); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-13-101 to -126 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 466-90 to -114 (West 1978): DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1901 - 25 (1976);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4501 to -4524 (1983); FLA. STAT. §§ 61-1302 to -1348 (1977);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-9-40 to -64 (1979); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 583-1 to -26 (1973);
IDAHO CODE §§ 32-1101 to -1126 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 2101 - 26
(Smith-Hurd 1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-11.6-1 to 11.6-25 (West 1977); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 598A.1 - .25 (West 1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1301 to -1326
(1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.400 - .630 (Baldwin 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:1700 - :1724 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 801 - 25 (1979); MD.
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 9-201 to -224 (1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 2089, §§ 1
- 14 (West 1983); MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.651 - .673 (West 1975); MINN.

STAT. §§ 518A.01 to .25 (1977); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-23-1 to -47 (1982); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 452.440 to .550 (Vernon 1978); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-7-101 to -125
(1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-1201 to -1225 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125A.010 to
.250 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 458-A:1 - :25 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:3428 to -52 (West 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-10-1 to -24 (1981); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW §§ 75-a - z (McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50A-1 to -25 (1979); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 14-14-01 to -26 (1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.21 - .37 (Page
1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1601 - 28 (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.700
- .930 (1973); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5341 - 66 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 15-14-1 to -26 (1978); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-782 to -830 (Law. Co-op. 1981);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 26-5A-1 to -26 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-6-201 to
-225 (1979); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51 - .75 (Vernon 1983); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-45c-1 to -26 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1031 - 51 (1983); V.I. CODE ANN
tit. 16, §§ 115 - 39 (1982); VA. CODE § 20-125 to 20-146 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 26.27.010 - .910 (1979); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-10-1 to -26 (1981); WIs. STAT.
ANN. §§ 822.01 - .25 (West 1976); Wyo. STAT. §§ 20-5-101 to -125 (1973); see also 9
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT 28-9 (Supp. 1987).

93. The prefatory comments to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act are
illustrative that the Commissioners realized the gravity of the child abduction
problem:
The harm done to children [by parental kidnapping] can hardly be overestimated. It does not require an expert in the behavioral sciences to know that
a child, especially during his early years and the years of growth, needs security and stability of environment and a continuity of affection. A child
who has never been given the chance to develop a sense of belonging and

whose personal attachments when beginning to form are cruelly disrupted,
may well be crippled for life, to his own lasting detriment and to the detriment of society.
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 112 (1979).
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tion in their favor.94 Section One states that the general purpose of
the Act includes avoiding "jurisdictional competition and conflict
with courts of other states in matters of child custody which have in
the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with
harmful effects on their well-being" 9 5 and "deter[ring] abductions
and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards." 9 6 The U.C.C.J.A. attempts to accomplish these goals
primarily by establishing guidelines aimed at decreasing the availa97
bility of custody order modifications.
The U.C.C.J.A. does this with multiple provisions. First, it sets
forth uniform guidelines to be used in determining which state has
the greatest interest in the custody dispute.98 It is this state 9 9 which
can assert exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute, with several exceptions. 100 The exceptions apply when no state meets the "home
state" criterialO t or when a state must exercise "emergency jurisdiction" in order to protect the child from immediate harm.' 0 2
The Act also makes it possible for the victim parent to obtain a
custody order in the home state after the child has been abducted,
even if the child's physical presence in the state cannot be demon94. Prior to the U.C.C.J.A., state courts based jurisdiction over custody disputes
upon the presence of the "res"; the child's domicile in the state. See, e.g., McCormick,
273 N.W.2d at 627. Combined with the erroneous belief that custody determinations
should be freely modifiable to serve the "best interests of the child," see supra notes
31-32, parents were almost encouraged by the law to "seize and run" with their children in search of a forum more likely to make a custody determination in their favor.
For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Bodenheimer, supra note 5.
95. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 1, 9 U.L.A. 116.

96. Id. at 117.
97. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
98. Under the U.C.C.J.A., "[t]he custody court has the greatest contact with the
child and maximum access to any evidence that may be needed to make a determination. It is assumed that the custody court wil be able to render a decree in the best
interests of the child." S. KATz, CHILD SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE
ABDUCTION OF CHILDREN 16 (1981); see also UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
§ 3, 9 U.L.A. 122.
99. The U.C.CJ.A. and other authorities refer to the state exercising rightful jurisdiction over the custody dispute as the "home state." See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION ACT § 2(5), 9 U.L.A. 119.
100. See infra notes 101-02.
101. Sections 3(a)(2) and 3(a)(4) provide for another state to assume jurisdiction
in cases where the family has moved frequently and no state would meet the "home
state" test, or where, for some other reason it is in the best interests of the child for
the state to assume jurisdiction. This is the "best interest of the child" exception. See
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. 122 (Comment).
102. The "emergency jurisdiction" exception is contained in the U.C.C.J.A. at section 3(a)(3). It provides that a state may assert jurisdiction if the child has been abandoned, or if the child has been subjected to or is threatened with "mistreatment or
abuse." UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3(a)(3), 9 U.L.A. 122.
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strated. 0 3 Additionally, the Act permits judges to assess all reasonable costs against the abductor parent, including attorneys' fees
which the victim parent expends in retrieving his or her child.104
Minnesota adopted the U.C.C.J.A. judicially in 1975105 and statutorily in 1977.106 By providing finality to determinations of jurisdiction and to custody decrees, the U.C.C.J.A. was an important step in
deterring parental kidnapping in Minnesota.
B.

The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act

The U.C.C.J.A. has been subject to some serious criticisms. 0 7
Although it is helpful in decreasing forum-shopping as a motive for
child-snatching,1O8 it fails to address other aspects of parental abduc103, The pertinent section states that a court may assert jurisdiction to make a
child custody determination by initial or modification decree if the state
had been the child's home state within 6 months before commencement of
the proceeding and the child is absent from [his] State because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons,
and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in [the] State.
UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3(a)(l)(ii), 9 U.L.A. 122. It is absolutely
essential that a victim parent without a preexisting custody decree obtain a child custody decree within six months of the abduction in order to take advantage of the
U.C.CJ.A.'s state jurisdiction provisions. S. KATz, supra note 98, at 17.
104. Under the Act, courts may award attorneys' fees, parties' costs and expenses,
and witnesses' costs and expenses. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 8(C),
11(c), 15(b), and 19(b), 9 U.L.A. 142, 148, 158, 162.
105. Judicial adoption of the U.C.CJ.A occurred in In re Giblin, 304 Minn. 510,
232 N.W.2d 214 (1975). The Minnesota Supreme Court there noted the confusion
existing nationally over jurisdictional criteria to be used in custody disputes:
We are struck by the disparity of treatment accorded these interstate custody disputes by the various jurisdictions. Even within one jurisdiction, the
results are often confused and conflicting. Although the situation literally
cries for attention, the United States Supreme Court has not chosen to provide definitive guidelines.
Id. at 517, 232 N.W.2d at 219. The court then cited with approval the prefatory note
to the U.C.CJ.A. Id. at 517-19, 237 N.W.2d at 219-20. Finally, the Giblin court
adopted the U.C.CJ.A., and urged that it be adopted statutorily in Minnesota:
We regard the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act as an authoritative
statement of the rules currently to be preferred in dealing with the problems
encountered in the instant case. Several states have adopted in whole or in
part this uniform act, and we commend it to the legislature for adoption
Id. at 523, 232 N.W.2d at 222.
106. The Minnesota legislature enacted the U.C.CJ.A. provisions in 1977. Those
provisions are codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 518A.01 to 518A.25 (1986).
107. As noted earlier, many states were slow to adopt the U.C.CJ.A. See supra
notes 90-91. This had the effect of creating "haven state" status in non-U.C.C.J.A.
states, where abducting parents frequently fled to obtain favorable custody decrees.
See Note, supra note 1, at 503. Professor Coombs also discussed possible unconstitutional applications of the Act. See Coombs, supra note 90, at 762-64.
108. See supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
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tions. 109 Consequently, I10 the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(P.K.P.A.)Itl was promulgated in 1980. The P.K.P.A. has three major sections. The first mandates full faith and credit for custody decrees rendered by a state in conformity with U.C.C.J.A.
provisions.'12 Second, the P.K.P.A. makes available the Federal Parental Locator Service to aid in locating abducting parents.]13 Finally, the P.K.P.A. applies the federal Fugitive Felon Act to parental
kidnapping cases; thus, enabling a victim parent to get F.B.I. assistance in some cases.1 4 F.B.I. assistance, however, is predicated on
109. The Act may allow concurrent jurisdiction in some situations, which could
result in conflicting decrees. Also, the Act does not require that states recognize
decrees rendered in other states. See S. KATZ, supra note 98, at 32-33; Note, supra
note 1, at 503. The U.C.C.J.A. is helpful only in cases where the abducting parent
has attempted to secure a custody determination through judicial processes. See
Comment, supra note 1, at 151. Finally, the U.C.C.J.A. fails to provide any assistance
to the victim parent in locating his or her kidnapped child. See PKPA Note, supra note
4, at 421.
110. See PKPA Note, supra note 4, at 423.
111. Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 653-55, 663 (1982), and 42 U.S.C. § 651 (Supp III 1985) (as amended by Pub. L.
No. 98-378, § 2, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984)).
112. Prior to the enactment of the P.K.P.A., states felt free to exercise jurisdiction
in the initial award or modification of custody determinations. See supra note 94. Historically, child custody awards have been considered modifiable in order to serve the
best interests of the child. In fact, the United States Supreme Court gave its approval
to "disregard the [custody] judgment, [of another state] to qualify it, or to depart
from it as does the State where it was rendered." New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey,
330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947); see Bodenheimer, Progress Under the U.C.C.J.A., supra note 5,
at 981. Since custody orders were modifiable, they were nonfinal, and therefore not
entitled to full faith and credit by other states under Article IV, Section 1 of the
United States Constitution. States were therefore free to totally disregard custody
orders rendered in another forum. See Coombs, supra note 90, at 793-94. The
P.K.P.A. mandates full faith and credit to all custody decrees rendered consistently
with U.C.C.J.A. principles, regardless of the finality of the decree. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(a), (d), and (f) (1982).

See also P. HOFF, LEGAL REMEDIES IN PARENTAL KIDNAPPING

CASES: A COLLECTION OF MATERIALS 8 (1986).
113. The Parental Locator Service (P.L.S.) provisions of the P.K.P.A. are codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 653 to 654 (1982). Individual states may contract for access to the
P.L.S. See P. HOFF, supra note 112, at 12. The P.L.S. was established initially to find
parents who were failing to make court rendered support payments. Through the
correlation of Social Security Administration, Internal Revenue Service, Department
of Health and Human Services information, the address and last known employer of
the abductor parent may be obtained. See Comment, supra note 5, at 67; FirstNational
Conference, supra note 9, at 26.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982). Before the P.K.P.A. was enacted, there was a definite resistance on the part of federal law enforcement officials to become involved in
parental kidnappings. See, eg., Foster & Freed, A Legislative Beginning to Child-Snatching
Prevention, 17 TRIAL 36, 37 (Apr. 1981). It is interesting to note that "[tihe only concerted opposition to PKPA came from the Department of Justice and law enforcement agencies that preferred to maintain the hands-off policy regarding custody
disputes," Foster & Freed, Family Law, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 287 (1982).
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issuance of a felony warrant by the state authorities.l"5 As a federal
law, the Act's provisions are available to residents of all states. In
order for the helpful P.K.P.A. provisions to be operative, however,
the parental kidnapping must be classified as a state felony.t16
C.

The Missing Children's Act

In 1982, Congress enacted the Missing Children's Act, which provides access to the National Crime Information Center (N.C.I.C.)
computer that is operated by the F.B.I.'t7 Under the Act, the missing person's"l 8 description is entered into the computer, regardless
of who the abductor was."l 9 As a federal law, the Act's provisions
are available to residents of all states.12 0 Minnesota, therefore, benefits from the Missing Children's Act.
IV.

MINNESOTA STATUTE SECTION

609.26

The P.K.P.A. is operative in Minnesota because under Minnesota
Statute section 609.26, parental kidnapping is a felony.121 Prior to
1984, under the parental kidnapping statute,' 2 2 the offense was a
115. It is therefore crucial that parental child-snatching be classified as a state felony. As of 1986, 48 states consider parental abduction a felony in some circumstances, 29 states consider it a misdemeanor, and two states do not punish parental
kidnapping. P. HOFF, supra note 112, at 19, App.F 9-49. The trend appears to be in
favor of stiffer penalites. Id. at 19.
116. See Comment, supra note 1, at 153.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 534. Parents can notify local police that their child has been
abducted. The police then enter the child's physical description into the computer,
and a description of the abductor parent. If the abductor-parent is subsequently
stopped by law enforcement officials on an unrelated charge (e.g., D.W.D.), a computer check through the N.C.I.C. computer will reveal the pending parental abduction felony charges, and the parent will be arrested. See P. HOFF, supra note 113, at
18.
118. Descriptions of any missing person (adult or child) may be entered into the
computer. See supra note 117.
119. Entry of the child's description into the computer is not dependent on
whether the abductor is a parent or stranger, or whether, if by a parent, the underlying offense is a state felony.
120. The Act requires only that the child be missing to enter his or her description
into the computer. See supra note 119. This is in contrast to the provisions of the
P.K.P.A., which require that parental kidnapping be a state felony in order to be
available to citizens of that state. See supra notes 115-16.
121. The statute in effect at the time of the Andow snatching provided:
Whoever violates this section may be sentenced as follows: (1) To imprisonment for not more than 90 days or to payment of a fine of not more than
$500, or both, if he voluntarily returns the child within 14 days after he
takes, detains or fails to return the child in violation of this section; or (2)
otherwise to imprisonment for not more than one year and one day or to
payment of a fine of $1,000, or both.
MINN. STAT. § 609.26, subd. 5 (Supp. 1979).
122. Id.
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misdemeanor for the first fourteen days following abduction. After
fourteen days had elapsed, the violation became a felony.1 2 3 The

1984 amendment was specifically aimed at obtaining law enforcement assistance in locating stolen children as soon as possible after
the abduction.124 It was recognized that the first few days after the
abduction was a critical time period in locating the victim child.125
Immediate assistance is even more crucial in view of the fact that as
many as ninety percent of the abducted children are never located
and returned.126

The 1984 amendments were designed to deter parental kidnapping. 127 This was done primarily by making the abduction an immediate felony.128

At the same time, the Minnesota Legislature

123. Id.
124. This is apparent from the remarks during the legislative hearings of Representative Gloria Segal:
The practice of police departments, because [parental abduction is] a misdemeanor, has been a reluctance to respond to cases such as this one [the
Korwin case, which had been previously related during the hearings]. Also,
the police department, even knowing where that child may be, can't get the
assistance of the F.B.I., Parent Locator Service, and so forth because it's not
a felony. So the police have to wait 14 days before they could request assistance on out of state cases. In this case, the child was in California. In the
early part of the case, the [victim] parent knew where the child was. As a
result of the delay, the victim parent, as so many parents have done and
been advised to do, hired a private investigator. It cost her over $5,000. It
took her four months before the child was located, and that's a good example of why we need to change that from a 14-day misdemeanor.
Hearings on H.F. 1347 Before the House Committee on theJudiciary, 73rd Minn. Legis., Feb.
20, 1984 (audio tape) (remarks of Gloria Segal, Representative).
125. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
127. The statement of Representative Gloria Segal is instructive:
The intent of this bill is not to put [abductor] parents in prison, but to give
the police and sheriffs the authority to act expeditiously and immediately on
behalf of the real victim, the child. Wisconsin has legislation that's very similar to that that's being proposed here today. According to the Milwaukee
County Attorney's Office, since legislation was passed making parental kidnapping a felony, 95% of the children [abducted] have been returned after
the offending parent was found and informed of the penalties.
Hearings on H.F. 1347 Before the House Committee on theJudiciary, 73rd Minn. Legis., Feb.
20, 1984 (audio tape) (statement of Gloria Segal, Representative). These sentiments
were echoed by Senator Pogemiller: "[wihat they're interested in is getting the child
back and creating a deterrence to parents to believe that it's a solution to their problem to abduct their child from the other parent." Hearings on H.F. 1347, S.F. 1318
Before the Senate Conference Committee on CriminalLaw, 73rd Minn. Legis., Apr. 3, 1984
(audio tape) (statement of Senator Pogemiller). The Minnesota Legislature also concurrently amended Minnesota Statute section 518.77 (1984), which mandates that all
court orders involving custody rights restate the provisions of section 609.26. It was
hoped that notice to parents that parental kidnapping is an immediate felony would
be an effective deterrent.
128. MINN. STAT. § 609.26 (1984). The misdemeanor provision was deleted and
subdivision 5 subsequently read:
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attempted to provide an incentive for the abducting parent to return
the child.129 Subdivision 5 requires that a felony charge under this
section be dismissed if the person voluntarily returns the child within
fourteen days after he takes, detains, or fails to return the child.13o
State v. Andow was concerned with this provision.t31
V.

State v. Andow

Jessica Christa Crumbley was born April 5, 1983,132 and is the
daughter of Joseph Crumbley and Deborah Andow, the defendant.13 3 A court order on March 14, 1984, adjudged Joseph Crumbley to be Jessica's father and awarded sole physical custody to Ms.
Andow.13 4 On June 8, 1984, following an argument, Mr. Crumbley
removed Jessica from Ms. Andow's apartment in violation of the
court order.I3 5 Subsequently, physical custody was temporarily
transferred to Crumbley until Ms. Andow completed an alcohol
treatment program.' 3 6 Andow was given visitation rights for two
hours each weekday evening.137 On August 3, 1984, Andow picked
Jessica up, but failed to return her at the end of the two hours.13 8 In
search of Jessica, Crumbley went to Andow's apartment which was
vacant.1 39 He found a letter written by Andow addressed to Andow's
sister on the mailbox outside,140 and opened the letter.t41 After
A felony charge brought under this section shall be dismissed if: (a) the
person voluntarily returns the child within 14 days after he takes, detains, or
fails to return the child in violation of this section; or (b)(1) the person taking the action and the child have not left the state of Minnesota; and (2)
within a period of 14 days after taking the action, (i) a motion or proceeding
under chapters 518, 518A, 518B or 518C is commenced by the person taking the action ....
MINN. STAT. § 609.26, subd. 5(a), (b)(1)(2)(i) (1984). Subdivision 5(b) was intended
to encourage parents to litigate in Minnesota if they felt it necessary to obtain a custody modification rather than to flee with a child.
129. See supra note 128.
130. See id.
131. Andow, 372 N.W.2d at 749; Andow, 386 N.W.2d at 232.
132. Brief for Appellant at 6, State v. Andow, 386 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1986).
133. Id.
134. Brief for Respondent at 6, State v. Andow, 386 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1986).
135. Id. The brief does not address whether either the argument between the parties or Crumbley's removal of Jessica from Andow's care concerned Andow's use of
alcohol.
136. Id. Crumbley was awarded temporary custody ofJessica by "Order AmendingJudgment" dated July 25, 1984. This situation would appear to lend support to
the argument in favor of freely modifiable custody decrees. Cf Bodenheimer, supra
note 5, at 1013.
137. Andow, 386 N.W.2d at 231.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 231. Andow's letter directed her sister to remove Andow's remaining
possessions from the apartment and to collect her security deposit. Id. Andow stated
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reading that Andow had "taken off with Jess," he contacted the
Rochester Police Department.142 A felony warrant for the defendant's arrest was then issued.143 Twelve days later, on August 15,
1984, Andow was apprehended on a felony warrant in Grand Forks,
North Dakota.144 Jessica, healthy and unharmed, was given up voluntarily by Ms. Andow's mother to Rochester Police and Family Service officials. 145

Ms. Andow waived extradition and was charged with a felony 146
under the amended Minnesota Statute section 609.26, which became
effective in August, 1984,147 two days before Andow failed to return
she would try to contact the sister using an assumed name. Brief for Respondent at
7. This illustrates the fact that abducting parents frequently attempt to involve family
members and friends. See Kolodny & Schwartz, Partnersin Crime, 7 FAM. ADvoc. 38
(1985). If a third party is involved in the concealing, he or she may be charged with a
felony. See MINN. STAT. § 609.26, subd. 1 (1) (1986).
141. See Andow, 386 N.W.2d at 231. The respondent contended that Crumbley's
seizure and opening of the letter was in violation of state and federal law. See Brief of
Appellant at 6, A- 1. The trial court did not reach the issue because it granted
Andow's motion to dismiss the felony charge. See id. at A-2 (Trial Court Opinion
Memorandum, Judge Morse). The statement that Andow was "taking off with Jess"
was important, because it bolstered the state's assertion that Andow had takenJessica
with "an intent substantially to deprive" Crumbley of his rights to visitation or custody in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.26, subdivision 1 (1), (4).
142. Brief for Appellant at 6.
143. Andow, 386 N.W.2d at 231.
144. Id. Since Andow had taken Jessica out of state, the only defense to the felony
charge available to her was under subdivision 5(a). MINN. STAT. § 609.26, subd. 5 (a)
(1986). The facts are silent regarding how Andow and the child were found. However, had there been no outstanding felony warrant for Andow's arrest, North Dakota
law enforcement officials would not have rendered any assistance. The 1979 hearing
addressed this issue:
While technically under the law you can use the extradition process for misdemeanors (gross misdemeanors), governors of most states are reluctant to
do so. On top of that, there are problems already with using the F.B.I. resources in trying to locate [abductor] parents in child stealing situations.
The F.B.I. has generally refused to do so and the lower the penalty, the less
likely that any other state is going to involve itself in the process. In reviewing other statutes in a number of other states, this is not an unusually high
penalty. In fact, it's low for child-stealing situations. In fact, there are some
states where it's a gross misdemeanor but there are also a number where it's
a felony and carries even a stiffer penalty than this does. I think that leaving
it a felony would allow Minnesota to use the extradition process and if that
penalty seems too harsh in a particular situation, the court clearly can modify it and impose whatever sentence is appropriate in the circumstances. If
you don't leave the felony penalties in there, we are going to run into troubles in attempting to use other states in the extradition process.
Hearings on H. F.: 1238 Before the House Committee on theJudiciary, 71st Minn. Legis., Apr.
12, 1979 (audio tape) (remarks of Jane Prohaska, Special Assistant, Office of the Attorney General of the State of Minnesota).
145. Brief for Respondent at 7, State v. Andow, 386 N.W.2d 230 (Minn. 1986).
146. Andow, 386 N.W.2d at 231.
147. The order which awarded custody to Crumbley was dated July 25, 1984. See
supra note 136 and accompanying text. The date of the notice provision of section
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Jessica to Crumbley.148 Andow moved to dismiss the complaint on
two grounds. First, she alleged a violation of notification provisions
in section 518.177, which require that all custody-related court orders must restate the provisions of section 609.26.149 Second, she
argued that subdivision 5(a) operates as a functional fourteen-day
grace period which mandates dismissal of felony charges in all cases
where children abducted by a parent are found and returned within
fourteen days of the abduction.150 The trial court agreed that the
legislature intended to extend to abducting parents the full benefit of
the fourteen day grace period.15l In his Trial Order Memorandum,
Judge Morse held:
It is not impossible that, had she not been arrested she still may
have returned the child to him of her own volition. Had that occurred, the felony charge currently pending would undoubtedly
been dismissed at once .... It could hardly have been the legislature's intent in providing this grace period to allow the actions of
15 2
law enforcement personnel to preempt this grace period.
Thus, the charges against Andow were dismissed 153 and the state
appealed.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals first addressed the issue of the
notice provisions of section 518.177.154 It held that the notification
requirement was essentially directory because no punitive conse1
quences were included for failure to comply with its provisions. 55
Then, the appeals court affirmed the trial court in holding that subdivision 5(a) operates as a functional fourteen-day grace period provided to all abducting parents.' 5 6 The court acknowledged that it
was attempting to determine the legislature's intent. 157 It relied
heavily on the statement of Representative Gloria Segal, one of the
amendment's sponsors. She said that the legislation was "not to put
518.177 took effect August 1, 1984. Act of April 25, 1984, ch. 484, § 4, 1984 Minn.
Laws 461, 463. Since the custody order was issued prior to the effective date of the
amendment, Crumbley's order was not void due to its lack of notice of felony penalties for child abduction. Andow argued unsuccessfully to the court of appeals that
this lack of notice mandated dismissal of her felony charge. Andow, 372 N.W.2d at
748-49. This holding was not appealed. Andow, 386 N.W.2d at 232, n.2.
148. Andow failed to return Jessica on August 3, 1984. Andow, 386 N.W.2d at
231.
149. Brief for Appellant at A-3.
150. Id.
151. Id. at A-5-6 (Trial Court Memorandum, Morse, Judge).
152. Id.
153. Id. at A-1-2.
154. Andow, 372 N.W.2d at 749.
155. Id. at 749. The court also included the chastisement, "[u]nawareness that
conduct is proscribed by criminal law is not generally a valid defense." Id.
156. Id. at 750.
157. Id. at 749.
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parents in prison but to give police and sheriffs the authority to act
expeditiously and immediately on behalf of the real victim, the
child."158 Thus, the court acknowledged the legislature's intent to
classify parental kidnapping as a felony in order to facilitate state and
federal law enforcement assistance and to trigger the P.K.P.A. provisions.159 The court of appeals, however, failed to discern the legislature's purpose underlying the mandatory dismissal provision.
The appeals court failed to perceive that the legislature intended
to "get tough" on parental kidnapping through deterrence and prosecution.160 What the appeals court failed to understand was that to
serve the overall purpose of deterring parental kidnapping, classifi16
cation of the parents' actions as a felony was absolutely essential. 1
This had been acknowleged by the Minnesota Supreme Courtt62 and
by the Minnesota Legislature.16 3 In fact, the court of appeals noted
that, "Police do not get involved during the first 14 days after a child
has been abducted because the crime is only a misdemeanor; rather,
the police wait until 14 days have expired and the offense has become a felony."164 The appeals court ignored the state's argument
that if subdivision 5(a) were construed as a functional fourteen-day
grace period that the "hands of law enforcement authorities would
effectively be tied for the first fourteen days since they would know
158. Id.
159. See id.; see also supra notes 107-31 and accompanying text.
160. "This is not a bill creating a new felony because under present Minnesota
statute it is already a felony to do this [abduct a child]. However, what the bill does is
to change and strengthen the provisions... " Hearingson H.F. 1347 Before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 73rd Minn. Legis., Feb. 20,1984 (audio tape) (statement of
Gloria Segal, Representative). Testimony in later hearings restressed the critical
need for a strong approach:
From the perspective of the victim parent, the prospect that they face is
never seeing their child again. When I use the word disappear, I mean that
word. [In] [m]ost of these cases the victim parent heard neither from the
offending parent or the child,. . . before the offending parent was arrested.
The ability to charge a felony is of critical importance because it is through
the felony charge that we have access to the N.C.I.C. computer. Even in the
other cases where the person is found through victim information or
whatever, we could not get the cooperation of the authorities without the
felony warrant. In a sense, a felony warrant, felony charge is overkill, in
some situations, you wish there was another way to get the child back and
not have a felony created, but the way the system works, frankly, there is no
other way. We try to take the human factor into account.
Hearings on H.F. 1347, S.F. 1318 Before the Senate Conference Committee on Criminal law,
73rd Minn. Legis., Mar. 16, 1984 (audio tape) (statement of Bill Nieman, Assistant
County Attorney, Hennepin County).
161. See supra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
162. "The purpose for making the offense of 'detaining' a felony is quite obviously to facilitate extradition. Governors are uniformly reluctant to extradite for offenses which are simply misdemeanors." McCormick, 273 N.W.2d at 627.
163. See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
164. Andow, 372 N.W.2d at 749.
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that no charge based on a violation of section 609.26 within the first
fourteen days would stand." 165 In its interpretation of subdivision
5(a), the court of appeals prioritized the policy of encouraging voluntary return of abducted children over the overall goal of deterrence. 1 66 It failed to understand that its construction of subdivision
5(a) would operate to prevent the location and return of parental
kidnapping victims.16 7 The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however,
did not have the final interpretation of the meaning of subdivision
68
5(a).1
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts' decisions.169 The Andow court took note of the legislature's
amendment of section 609.26 in 1984, when it changed the offense
from a misdemeanor to a felony.1 70 The supreme court understood
that it was essential to classify parental kidnapping as an immediate
felony to obtain law enforcement assistance, and to serve the overall
deterrent purposes of the legislation.171 Justice Simonett, writing
for the court stated:
[A]llowance of a 14-day grace period would frustrate the very purpose the 1984 amendment seeks to achieve. If the felony charge
must be dismissed because 14 days have not elapsed, then failure
to return the child within 14 days becomes an element of the crime.
A felony warrant can issue only on probable cause that all elements
17 2
of the crime have been committed.
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that under Minnesota Statute section 609.26, subdivision 5(a), the felony charge will be dismissed only in response to the voluntary return of the child by the
73
abducting parents.1
It is apparent that the court correctly discerned the legislature's
intent based upon the Minnesota Legislature's response to Andow. 174
Effective August, 1986, subdivision 5 includes the following directive: "Clause (a) does not apply if the person returns the child as a
165. Brief for Appellant at 8.
166. Andow, 372 N.W.2d at 750.
167. See, e.g., supra note 16 and accompanying text.
168. See 386 N.W.2d 230.
169. Id. at 233. The holding of the supreme court was affirmed by the Minnesota
Legislature's subsequent amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 609.26, subdivision 5. Act approved March 25, 1986, ch. 463, § 5, 1986 Minn. Laws 975, 979 (adding the language: "Clause (a) does not apply if the person returns the child as a
result of being located by law enforcement authorities.").
170. Andow, 386 N.W.2d at 232.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 232, 233.
173. Id. at 233.
174. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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result of being located by law enforcement authorities."175 At last,
the judicial and legislative approaches in the alleviation of parental
7
kidnapping are unified.1 6
CONCLUSION

Although Minnesota currently has one of the best approaches in
combatting the terrible problem of parental kidnapping,' 7 7 more
could be done.178 For example, on the state level, tort actions could
be pursued. 179 Other states have recently recognized tort actions for
intentional infliction of emotional distress,180 false imprisonment,' 81
175. 1986 Minn. Laws ch. 463, § 5, 1986 Minn. Laws 975, 979, amending MINN.
§ 609.26, subd. 5.
176. The 1987 legislature enacted the following three changes to section 609.26:
Subdivision 2(3): [adds the language] but consent to custody or specific visitation is not consent to the action of failing to return or concealing a minor

STAT.

child.

Subdivision 5(b): [adds the language] This subdivision does not prohibit
the filing of felony charges or an offense report before the expiration of the
14 days.
Subdivision 6: [PENALTY] Except as otherwise provided in subdivsion 5,
whoever violates this section may be sentenced to imprisonment for not
more than two years or to payment of a fine of $4,000, or both.
Act approved May 26, 1987, ch. 246 §§ 1, 2, 3 (Minn. slip law).
As noted above, the amendment of subdivision 2(3) clarifies that consent is not
an available defense to the felony if the abduction follows exercise of rightful visitation rights. The change in subdivision 5(b) should resolve all doubts that expiration
of the 14 day period is not to be considered an element of the felony. Finally, the
increase in the penalties to two years' imprisonment (from one year and one day) and
a fine of $4,000 (from $3,000) should send a clear message to law enforcement officials that the legislature is serious about combatting parental kidnapping.
177. Minnesota is one of only half of the states in which parental kidnapping is
punished exclusively as a felony. P. HOFF, supra note 112, at App. F 6-50. Violation
of a court order is not a prerequisite to the application of the statute; visitation rights
of the noncustodial parent are expressly protected. The Minnesota statute contains
other desirable features also. Reimbursement of the victim's parent's expenses is
available, and the mandatory dismissal provision applies when the absconding parent
returns the child within 14 days of his own volition. The statute also exempts parents
who take a child due to an emergent family situation and who subsequently use the
judicial process to effect a change in the custody order. MINN. STAT. § 609.26. For
an informative overview of the different state parental kidnapping statutes, see P.
HOFF, supra note 112, at App.F 6-50 (comparative table of parental kidnapping/custodial interference laws and 50-state survey of parental kidnapping laws as
of 1985). Minnesota has also adopted the U.C.C.J.A., see supra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
179. Although a thorough discussion of tort remedies for parental kidnapping is
beyond the scope of this Comment, for persuasive arguments in favor of their acceptance, see generally Reynolds, supra note 3 (arguing for expansion of tort remedies
available to victim parents); Comment, supra note 1 (advocating use of intentional
infliction of emotional distress theories in tort actions against abductor-parents).
180. See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 338 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Iowa 1983); Kramer v.
Leineweber, 642 S.W.2d 364, 369 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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harboring,' 8 2 and custodial interference.183 Also, liability could be
extended to third parties who play a part in orchestrating and completing a child abduction.184 The greatest advantage to allowing tort
recovery in this area is that the recovery of monetary damages would
enable a victim parent to pursue a costly and time-consuming search
for an abducted child.185 Additionally, if co-conspirators could be
held jointly and severally liable, the resulting financial burdens
placed on those parties might encourage abducting parents to return
stolen children.' 8 6 Another possible preventive approach is
mandatory court-ordered mediation in all custody cases.' 8 7 California has adopted this practice188 and has found it to be effective in
decreasing the chances that a child will become a pawn in a custody
fight between his parents.' 8 9 Mediation could be a valuable tool in
the arsenal against child-snatching.
Some approaches cannot be strengthened by additional lawmaking. Law enforcement officials at both state and federal levels190
must be unrelentless in their search for missing children. If additional resources are necessary, they should be forthcoming.191 Finally, laws -

however good -

are no good unless enforced. Once

located, we must vigorously prosecute parental kidnappers in order
to communicate the message that society will not tolerate the abduction of children.
In sum, current Minnesota law has come a long way since the days
when parental kidnapping was condoned. Following a rocky course,
the Minnesota Legislature has persisted in its desire to correct the
problem, and has developed a workable approach. Parental kidnapping is still an enormous and heartbreaking problem. We must con181. See, e.g., Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15, 18-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying
New York law).

182. See, e.g., Hinton v. Hinton, 436 F.2d 211, 212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also
Comment, supra note 1, at 155.
183. See, e.g., Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221 Cal. App. 2d 431, 34 Cal. Rptr. 479 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1963) (recognizing claims against paternal grandfather for his assistance in
interfering with mother's custody).
184. See Kolodny & Schwartz, supra note 140, at 40-42.
185. See generally Reynolds, supra note 3, at 253-54; Comment, supra note 1, at 16263.
186. See Reynolds, supra note 3, at 254; Comment, supra note 1, at 163.
187. For an excellent discussion of this alternative, see Comment, Court-Sponsored
Custody Mediation to Prevent ParentalKidnapping: A Disarmament Proposal, 18 ST. MARY'S

L.J. 361 (1986).
188. Id. at 388.
189. Id. at 388 nn.152-53.
190. The problem of international child abductions is beyond the scope of this
comment.
191. See generally Pick, supra note 9 (discussing the need for development of the law
in this area).
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tinue to pursue effective remedies, including expansion of available
tort remedies, use of mandatory custody mediation, vigorous enforcement of existing laws, and dogged law enforcement efforts in
locating stolen children.
Mary E. Shearen
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